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NOTES
THE PRESENCE OF A MOTIVE TO MISREPRESENT AS
JUSTIFICATION FOR EXCLUDING EXCULPATORY
DECLARATIONS OF MENTAL CONDITION
"The great characteristic feature of the common law of evi-
dence is the group of rules requiring that testimony be limited to
statements in court of witnesses who observed the facts at first hand
and are produced for cross-examination."' In aggregate we refer
to these rules as the hearsay rule of evidence. The hearsay rule
excludes "testimony in court or written evidence, of a statement
made out of court, such statement being offered as an assertion to
show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its
value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter.12
Exclusion of hearsay evidence is justified upon several grounds.
Among these are: the declarant was not under oath: there is no
opportunity to observe his demeanor: there is danger of inaccuracy
in reporting second-hand statements: and, finally, that there is no
opportunity to cross-examine the declarantC
These ideals in the law of evidence must, of course. he com-
promised to meet the needs of reality. Rigid adherence to the hear-
say rule would exclude too much evidence of obvious probative
worth. The justification for admitting some hearsay evidence is the
impossibility or prohibitive inconvenience of obtaining direct testi-
mony. Thus, the death, absence, or insanity of the declarant may
necessitate receiving otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence :4 aldi
the obvious difficulty of obtaining testimony of all the authors of
learned treatises, business records, and affidavits similarly neces-
sitates admission of the material though it is hearsay.' The justifi-
cation for admitting other hearsay evidence is its relatively great
reliability. This is particularly true in the case of a party's spon-
taneous exclamations and declarations of physical or mental con-
dition.' Where mental condition is involved there is no danger
of a lack of personal knowledge. Another factor which speaks for
1. McCormick, Evidence § 300, at 626 (1954) (hereinafter cited a'
McCormick).
2. Id. § 225, at 460.
3. See id. . 224, at 458-59.
4. See 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1421(1) (3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited
as Wigmore).
5. See McCormick § 296; Wigmore § 1631.
6. See 6 id. § 1714, at 58.
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the veracity of these declarations is that they were made under
circumstances indicating probable sincerity.-
The circumstantial guarantee of sincerity is particularly obvious
in the case of a party's admissions, since there is no motive to mis-
represent when the misrepresentation would only result in needless
incrimination." Therefore, it is not surprising that under the ad-
missions exception to the hearsay rule the prosecution may intro-
duce any and every relevant out-of-court declaration of an accused
person indicating a mental state which attaches guilt to the ac-
cused's acts.9
An accused's declarations tending to negative the mental state
requisite for guilt are, of course, not receivable as admissions. Con-
sequently, if the defense wishes to use the same type of hearsay
evidence which is always available to the prosecution it must
qualify this evidence for admission under the mental condition ex-
ception to the hearsay rule. Under this exception, whenever a per-
son's mental state is in issue, his statements of a presently existing
(1) design or plan, and (2) motive, reason or intent are admissible
in evidence to prove that mental state, providing the statements
were made under circumstances indicating apparent sincerity.'*
However, since the mental condition exception is partly founded
on the apparent reliability of the statements involved, the rationale
of the exception weakens as the motive to misrepresent increases.
Self-interest is one motive to misrepresent; thus an exculpatory
statement of mental condition has less circumstantial guarantee of
sincerity than an incriminating one. When courts have found that
the relatively greater value of a hearsay statement of mental condi-
tion is negatived by a counter-motive to misrepresent in order to
preserve the declarant's self-interest, they have tended to label that
statement as "self-serving" and exclude it. The purpose of this
Note is to examine and evaluate the reasoning of courts which ex-
clude these exculpatory declarations of mental condition.
7. See Hinton, States of Mind and the Hearsay Rule, I U. Chi. L. Rev.
394, 414 (1934).
8. See Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30
Yale L.J. 355, 361 (1921). Other generally stated reasons for receiving a
party's admissions as an exception to the hearsay rule are that lie will not
be heard to complain that he was not under oath when he made the state-
ment, and that he will not be heard to complain of lack of opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant since he is the declarant and may take the stand
to explain or qualify his declaration. Ibid.
9. 6 Wigmore § 1732.
10. Statements of emotion and of opinion or belief are equally adinis-
sible but problems concerning such statements occur less frequently in the
case law. See McCormick § 268. at 567.
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THE SO-CALLED RULE OF EXCLUSION OF "SELF-SERVING
STATEMENTS"
The language of many courts suggests that there is a blanket
rule of exclusion of all "self-serving statements."" The difficulty
with such a separate and distinct exclusionary rule is that it would
seemingly exclude any exculpatory declaration irrespective of the
exception to the hearsay rule under which it is sought to be ad-
mitted. However, an examination of the authorities shows that an
overwhelming majority of all applications of the supposed exclu-
sionary rule involve only declarations of mental condition. Trhus, it
is obvious that as a practical matter courts do not employ this
blanket rule of exclusion of "self-serving statements.""2
An apparently sounder reason for excluding exculpatory de-
clarations of mental condition is expressed in Lebrun v. Boston &
M. R. R.:
"The reason for their rejection, although not heretofore de-
veloped in the cases, is not, however, based upon an inlependqnt
exclusionary principle of evidence, but upon the ground that,
being extra-judicial statements, they do not come within the
exceptions to the hearsay rule because they evidence a positive
counter motive to misrepresent.""
Therefore, when this motive to misrepresent is obvious, the
"self-serving" label is applied and the declaration excluded. The
exclusion is the result, not of any separate exclusionary rule, but
of a failure of the statement to qualify as an exception to the hear-
say rule.
The broad language used by some courts to exclude an ac-
cused's exculpatory declaration as "self-serving" has often been
used by other courts to justify the exclusion of other exculpatory
statements when the motive to deceive in the respective cases is in
no way comparable. This blind observance of a rule without refer-
ence to the reason behind it has produced a body of case law which
excludes all exculpatory declarations of an accused as to his mental
condition, when the important consideration is not merely whether
the declaration is exculpatory, but rather, to what extent its self-
11. See e.g., Stone v. Union Fire Ins. Co., 106 Colo. 522, 107 P.2d 241
(1940) ; State v. Gadwood, 342 Mo. 466, 482-84, 116 S. W. 2d 42, 51-52
(1937).
12. McCormick states that most courts will receive declarations made
by a party and offered in his own behalf if these declarations fall within one
of the established exceptions to the hearsay rule. However, when the ex-
culpatory declaration deals with the declarant's mental condition, court
often apply a supposed rule of exclusion of "self-serving statements." See
McCormick § 275.
13. 83 N. H. 293, 298, 142 Atl. 128, 132 (1928) (dictum).
ol. 40:8 4
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interested nature detracts from its probative worth. To understand
properly the real meaning of this case law it is necessary to separate
those cases dealing with various types of mental condition and to
inquire as to the presence and effect of a motive to deceive in each
type of declaration.
DECLARATIONS CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH THE AcT: OFFERED TO
SHow THE INTENT WITH WH1ICH1 THE ACT WAS DONE
Even courts which pay lip service to an apparently all-encom-
passing rule of exclusion of "self-serving statements" admit these
statements if they also qualify for admission under the res gestae
exception to the hearsay rule.14 The reason for admitting such
declarations is not that they are less "self-serving" than declara-
tions made prior or subsequent to the act, but rather that they were
generated spontaneously by the extrinsic circumstances and are
not the result of individual wariness seeking to manufacture favor-
able evidence. 15 Since this circumstantial guarantee of sincerity
effectively counterbalances the self-interested motive to misrepre-
sent, courts have apparently felt no need to apply the "self-serving"
label to the accused's contemporaneous declarations of mental con-
dition.
The mental condition exception, unlike the res gestae exception,
imposes no requirement that the declaration be contemporaneous
with the act in question. But as a result of the rigid exclusion by
courts of an accused's prior and subsequent declarations of mental
state when offered under the mental condition exception, there is
often an attempt to qualify these types of declarations as res gestae.
This produces an undesirable result whether it succeeds or fails.
If it fails, valuable evidence to show state of mind has been ex-
cluded. If, on the other hand, the defense succeeds in classifying a
prior or subsequent statement as res gestae, the res gestae excep-
tion is thereby tortured out of all reasonable proportion and the
real significance of the exception (the requirement of spontaneity)
obscured.' 6
If the real basis of reasoning behind the mental condition ex-
ception were understood, there would be no need to struggle with
14. This proposition is usually stated in terms which exclude "self-
serving statements" unless they are a part of the res gestae. See e.g., Moss
v. State, 208 Ark. 37, 185 S.W.2d 92 (1945); Rabun v. Wynn, 209 Ga. 80,
81, 70 S.E.2d 745, 747 (1952) (dictum).
15. See I Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 280 (12th ed. 1955).
16. See State v. Young, 119 Mo. 495, 523, 24 S. W. 1038, 1046 (1894).
where the court referred to a statement made by the defendant one month
before the act as part of the res gestae.
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the res gestae concept when dealing with the statements of an
accused or of anyone else.1" If the motive to misrepresent can be
negatived or can be shown to be subordinate to other considera-
tions, the declaration of mental condition should be admissible and
its occurrence in point of time is irrelevant. Under such an inter-
pretation the defense would not be forced to strain the logic of the
classification systems to qualify its evidence under the favored res
gestae exception.
DECLARATIONS PRIOR TO TIE AcT:
-offered to show a design or plan of the accused
Courts seldom apply the "self-serving" label to exculpatory
declarations of design or plan."8 The courts apparently reason that
the relative value of this evidence out-weighs the potential harni
which might be done if it were received though untrue. The prob-
able absence of motive to falsify this sort of declaration may be
seen from the following example: Assume that .4 is accused of
fraud in the filing of his federal income tax return, and that to rebut
this accusation he seeks to introduce into evidence a letter which
he had written to his accountant before the return was filed and
which expressed his desire that the return be a complete and
honest one. This declaration is offered to show inferentially that
the defendant's plan to file an honest return was carried through."'
Although this declaration is now offered in the defendant's own
interest, its present "self-serving" nature does not relate back to
affect the veracity of the declaration at the time it was made.
Declarations of design or plan by their very nature are prolbably
not made with a self-interested motive because they are, of neces-
sity, prior in time to the main fact from which the litigation arose
and have reference to it primarily to show a proposed mode of
conduct which is either consistent or inconsistent with the part
the accused is alleged to have played in the happening of that nmain
fact.20 Under such circumstances, the danger of self-interested falsi-
fication seems remote enough to be discounted so far as the ques-
tion of admissibility is concerned.
A second consideration which might influence courts to adnit
the posed hypothetical declaration of design is its indirect function
in proof. A statement offered for a non-assertive purpose, i.e., to
prove something other than the truthfulness of the matters asserted
17. See Hutchins and Slesinger, State of Mind in Issue, 29 Colum. .
Rev. 147 (1929).
18. See 6 Wigmore § 1732, at 99.
19. See White v. United States, 216 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1954).
20. See 6 Wigmore § 1725.
[ Vol. 40:844
NOTES
therein, is not hearsay at all according to most legal writers. It is,
rather, circumstantial evidence and should be freely admissible
without regard to its out-of-court origin, so far as it is relevant.2-
The classic example is that the declaration, "I am the Emperor
Napoleon," is admissible when offered to show the declarant's in-
sanity; but inadmissible as hearsay if offered to prove that the
declarant really is the Emperor Napoleon. Similarly, in the tax fraud
example, A seeks to show that he had no plan to defraud the
government but the statement he offers into evidence is not, "I
have no plan to defraud," but rather the direction, "File a com-
plete and honest return."
The fact is that most courts do not make this distinction," and
since this Note is concerned with the treatment courts give to
exculpatory statements which they do consider hearsay (rightly or
wrongly), no further consideration will be given to the hearsay-
circumstantial evidence dichotomy. Nevertheless, it seems probable
that the indirectness of such statements serves as one factor in
negating the presence of a motive to misrepresent and thus helps
justify the admission of exculpatory declarations of design or plan.
-offered to siow the motive, reason, or intent with which the act
was dow-
Prior declarations of motive, reason, or intent are similar to
declarations of design or plan to the extent that both occur prior, in
point of time, to the main act which has given rise to the litigation.
They are distinguishable from declarations of design or plan in
that they are not merely evidence indicating that the proposed plan
was subsequently consummated, but rather represent a state of mind
which is itself in issue as a separate element of the legal situation."
A homicide, for example, may or may not be murder depending on
the intent with which it was done. The prior statement of motive,
reason, or intent is connected to the main act which has given rise
to the litigation because the statement of intent was made with
reference to the main act and in some way qualifies that act.
Thus it can be seen that the distinction between a declaration of
design or plan and a declaration of intent is a rather tenuous one
resting only on the directness of the statement's relation to the
main act. Notwithstanding this substantial similarity, most courts
apply the "self-serving" label and exclude the accused's prior
21. See McCormick § 228, at 463, § 268, at 567.
22. See id. § 268, at 567.
23. See 6 Wigmore § 1727, at 88.
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declarations which tend to show his desire to abide by the law,2 4
his affection for the deceased . 5 his justifiable fear of the deceased,2
his desire to avoid trouble with the deceased,27 or, indeed, any
prior declaration of intent with regard to the main act. Apparently
the direct reference which these statements make to the main act
is enough to convince most courts that the accused made the state-
ment with some sort of anticipatory awareness that he would need
evidence to show his good motives with relation to that act.
There exists an unsubstantial but persuasive line of authority
which would admit an accused's prior exculpatory declarations of
intent. This is based on a recognition of the great need of the
defense to secure the admission of these declarations since in most
criminal cases the accused's state of mind is all-important in deter-
mining guilt and there often is no way to prove a mental state
which negatives guilt except by the accused's own declarations as
to that mental state. These courts usually simply avoid mentioning
a separate exclusionary rule of "self-serving statements" and pro-
ceed to admit the statements under the mental condition excep-
tion.2 8 They apparently find no motive on the accused's part to mis-
represent, or at least they feel that the motive is not strong enough
to require exclusion of the declaration and are therefore willing to
let the jury evaluate the veracity of the declaration.
Among legal writers, the foremost advocates of admission of
exculpatory declarations of mental condition are McCormick and
Wigmore. McCormick treats the supposed exclusionary rule of
"self-serving statements" as a sort of vestigial remnant of the
ancient doctrine of interest, which excluded all testimony of inter-
ested parties. He suggests that when the doctrine of interest was
abolished by statute, the supposed exclusionary rule of "self-serving
statements" should have been abolished by implication, and that
exculpatory declarations of any type should be admissible if they
can qualify under any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.20
Wigmore argues that to exclude an accused's exculpatory state-
ments when his incriminating statements are receivable as admis-
sions is to repudiate the concept of the presumption of innocence.
24. Hugennie v. State, 76 Ga. App. 436, 46 S.E.2d 210 (1948) (evidence
of defendant's application for police protection excluded).
25. People v. Smith, 15 Cal. 2d 640, 104 P. 2d 510 (1940).
26. E.g., State v. Barnett, 156 Kan. 746, 137 P.2d 133 (1943) ; Fleenor
v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 526, 75 S.W. 2d 1 (1934) (expressions of hostility
admitted, but expressions of fear excluded).
27. State v. Gadwood, 342 Mo. 466, 116 S.W.2d 42 (1937).
28. E.g., Parsons v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 764, 121 S.E. 68 (1924):
Worth v. Worth, 48 Wyo. 441, 49 P.2d 649 (1935).
29. See McCormick § 275.
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since in so doing the courts use the possible trickery of guilty per-
sons as a ground for excluding evidence in favor of one who has
not yet been proved guilty.30 However, it is the motive to misrepre-
sent which militates against the admission of these prior declarations
of mental condition and that motive does not necessarily hinge on
guilt or innocence. A better reason for admitting these declarations
is that it is improbable that the accused considered that his prior
statements might be needed to exonerate him from a crime which
had as yet not even materialized. The prior exculpatory declaration
of mental state meets the general requirements of the mental con-
dition exception to the hearsay rule, including the requirement of
apparent sincerity; consequently, it would seem that such a declara-
tion ought to be admitted.
DECLARATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO THE AcT: OFFERED TO SHOW THE
INTENT WITH WHICH THE ACT WAS DONE
The case for excluding an accused's exculpatory declarations of
mental condition is strongest with regard to those declarations
made subsequent to the act. Here there is no doubt that the state-
ment may have been made with full knowledge of the effect it
would have in interpreting the main act. For instance, after a
homicide any accused might be motivated to say that it was an
accident, or self-defense, or that he had only the best of intentions
with regard to the deceased. Since the motive to misrepresent looms
so large, these declarations are almost universally excluded."
It is only in the field of wills that any subsequent declarations of
mental condition are regularly admitted. This admission is justified
partly out of necessity, since the testator is dead and was often the
only one who had any knowledge of his intentions concerning the
distribution of his estate. Also it has been urged that the testator
has no self-interested motive to misrepresent.32 McCormick sug-
gests that the practice of admitting the testator's subsequent declara-
tions of mental condition may serve as a core for a wider exception
to the hearsay rule whereby other subsequent declarations of
mental condition may be admitted.33
One argument in favor of admitting an accused's subsequent
30. See 6 Wigmore § 1732, at 102. This argument is apparently persua-
sive but it assumes that only guilty persons have a motive to misrepresent.
In reality, it seems at least possible that some innocent persons also might
wish to impress the jury with their good intentions toward the deceased, even
though these good intentions never existed, in order to insure their exonera-
tion.
31. See Fortner v. State, 56 So. 2d 17 (Miss. 1952).
32. See McCormick § 271, at 577.
33. See id. at 578.
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declarations of mental condition, in spite of the presence of a motive
to misrepresent, is that since the accused may be innocent and may
be telling the truth and since there is often no other way to prove
absence of an incriminating mental state, the accused is placed at too
great a disadvantage if these declarations are excluded.14 In this
general frame of reference Wigmore argues that since the ac-
cused's subsequent incriminating statements would be available for
the prosecution as admissions and since the accused may be telling
the truth, his subsequent exculpatory statements ought out of fair-
ness to be admitted under the mental condition exception." This line
of argument may seem to disregard the basic requirement of the
mental condition exception--that the declaration must be made
under circumstances indicating probable sincerity. But as a matter
of practical justice the argument has weight, since there is always
the possibility that the accused is not misrepresenting the intent
with which he did the act in question.
CONCLUSION
Any court confronted with an exculpatory declaration of mental
condition finds itself upon the horns of a dilemma. One horn of this
dilemma consists of the danger that the declarant may have been
lying and that admission of the declaration will only impede the
administration of justice. But if the court avoids this danger by
excluding the declaration it has done nothing more than impale
itself upon the other horn of that dilemma because the declarant may
have been telling the truth. Surely it is worse to exclude a declara-
tion which may be true than to admit one which may be false. The
danger of self-interested misrepresentation is mollified by the jury's
discretionary power to disregard the evidence if it appears to lack
credibility. Consequently, it seems more reasonable to allow the
jury to evaluate such exculpatory declarations in the light of all the
attendant circumstances than to exclude it arbitrarily because of a
possible lack of reliability. Mere admission of any exculpatory
declaration does not mean that the jury will necessarily, or even
probably, give credence to it. But such admission does provide the
accused with an argument for exoneration, which no possibly inno-
cent man ought to be denied. Since there is no independent exclu-
sionary rule of exculpatory declarations of mental condition, and
since the mental condition exception is flexible enough to serve as
a vehicle for their admission, these declarations can be received
without offense to the established rules of evidence.
34. See United States v. Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (1944).
35. See 6 Wigmore § 1732, at 103-05.
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